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Abstract
Mathematical proof lies at the foundations of mathematics, but there are several
notions of what mathematical proof is, or might be. In fact, the idea of mathe-
matical proof continues to evolve. In this article, I review the body of literature
that argues that there are at least two widely held meanings of proof, and that
the standards of proof are negotiated and agreed upon by the members of math-
ematical communities. The formal view of proof is contrasted with the view of
proofs as arguments intended to convince a reader. These views are examined
in the context of the various roles of proof. The conceptions of proof held by
students, and communities of students, are discussed, as well as the pedagogy
of introductory proof-writing classes.
What is a mathematical proof? This question, and variations on it, have
been debated for some time, and many answers have been proposed. One
variation of this question is the title of this article: “What do we mean by
mathematical proof?” Here we may stand for the international community
of mathematicians, a classroom of students, the human race as a whole,
or any number of other mathematical communities. When the question is
phrased this way, it becomes clear that any answer to this question must,
in one way or another, take into account the fact that mathematics and
mathematical proof are endeavors undertaken by people, either individually
or communally.2
This article will discuss two answers to this question that are held by
mathematicians and mathematics educators, and how those answers affect
1Portions of this article previously appeared in the author’s doctoral dissertation, [7].
2By this statement, I do not mean to take sides in the debate over whether mathematics
is “discovered” or “created”; in either case, it is people who discover or create mathematics.
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the notions of proof held by communities of students. First, we will contrast
the “formal” definition of proof with the “practical” meaning described by
Reuben Hersh and others. Second, we will discuss these meanings in the con-
text of the different roles played by mathematical proofs. Third, beliefs about
proof that are held by students and communities of students are outlined.
Finally, we will discuss some of the ways proof is introduced in the classroom,
with an eye toward the effect of the meanings of proof on pedagogy.
1. Formal and Practical Notions of Proof
Proof is fundamental to mathematics; we do not know whether a math-
ematical proposition is true or false until we have proved (or disproved) it.
Therefore, the question of “What do we mean by mathematical proof?” is
not an idle one. The answer to this question given by the worldwide com-
munity of mathematicians, educators, philosophers, and others interested in
mathematics continues to be negotiated and to evolve. In fact, there are at
least two prevalent meanings of proof in this community. These meanings
will be discussed below.
Let us take, as a starting point, the description of proof given by Gian-
Carlo Rota: “Everybody knows what a mathematical proof is. A proof of
a mathematical theorem is a sequence of steps which leads to the desired
conclusion. The rules to be followed by such a sequence of steps were made
explicit when logic was formalized early in this century, and they have not
changed since” [47, p.183]. As Rota’s opening sentence indicates (see also
[2]), this is what most mathematicians believe their proofs accomplish. This
notion could be called the formal meaning of proof. However, as Rota [47]
points out later in the same article, and as will be discussed below, this
description is unrealistic in describing the proofs that most mathematicians
actually write.
This formal notion of proof, or something close to it, had been held by
some mathematicians at the beginning of the 20th century [22]. Three schools
of thought sought to ground the foundations of mathematics at this time; of
these, perhaps the most well-known is the formalist school of David Hilbert.
The formalists sought to show that areas of mathematics are free of contra-
dictions by writing their statements in a formal language, and proving them
using formal rules of inference [50]. For the formalists, the meaning of a
mathematical proposition was irrelevant, proofs were exclusively based on
syntactic constructs and manipulations. The original goal of the formalist
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school ultimately failed in 1931, when the publication of Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorems showed that no formal system that includes even simple
arithmetic can be both complete and free of contradiction.3
To the Hilbert school of formalists, the role of proof was to show that
a particular part of mathematics was free of contradiction, and to thereby
validate the theorems of that branch of mathematics. Indeed, today the most
visible role of proof is to verify the truth of published theorems.4 A present-
day version of formalism can be seen in a current project to use computers
and specialized languages to complete formal proofs of major mathematical
theorems [19, 28]. Hales [19] puts such formal proofs in the context of a
larger project to automate the formal proving of theorems.
This formal notion of proof has some important limitations. In all but
the most trivial cases, a purely formal proof is, or would be if it were written
down, far too long to be of any interest or value. One report notes that a
purely formal proof of the Pythagorean theorem, beginning from Hilbert’s
axioms of geometry, was nearly 80 pages long ([46] cited in [59]) An even more
extreme example is cited by Hales [19]: to fully expand the definition of the
number “1”, in terms of the primitives of Bourbaki’s Theory of Sets, would
require over four trillion symbols! In principle, the proof of any theorem
can be written in such a formal way, but such formalizations of proofs are
almost always too lengthy to be of value to human readers. Therefore, this
purely formal notion of proof does not reflect the practice of mathematicians
[20, 47, 57]. The automated proofs described by Hales [19] might, indeed,
be able to prove previously unproven theorems, but Auslander [2] questions
whether we would be satisfied with such a proof, that could not be read or
understood by a human mathematician.
These purely formal proofs represent an extreme version of the formal
meaning of proof. More often, the notion of formal proofs allows for proofs
to be condensed using previously proven theorems or lemmas. Nonetheless,
the formal meaning of proof is the understanding that proofs can be read,
understood, and checked entirely within the context of an axiomatic system
and formal rules of logic [53].
3Nonetheless, the formalist school made many important contributions to modern
mathematics. A much more complete, and yet accessible, discussion of the formalist
school of thought, and the other two major schools of thought at that time, can be found
in Snapper [50].
4As discussed below, this is really only one of the roles of mathematical proof.
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Hersh [32] and others have argued that there is another distinct meaning
of “mathematical proof,” in addition to the formal meaning of proof described
above. This second meaning of proof, which Hersh calls “practical mathe-
matical proof,” is informal and imprecise. As described by Hersh, “Practical
mathematical proof is what we do to make each other believe our theorems”
[32, p.49].5 This is the meaning that many (but not all) mathematicians use
in their practice of mathematics, in which the meaning of the mathematics
is not only present but essential to the proof.
The practical meaning implies that proof has a subjective side; the goal
of a proof is to convince the mathematical community of the truth of a the-
orem. That is, mathematics is a human endeavor, since proofs are written,
read, understood, verified, and used by humans. This point is made by Davis
and Hersh [10] in an imaginary dialogue between their Ideal Mathematician
and a philosophy student who asks for a definition of proof. The Ideal Math-
ematician, when pressed, offers the following [10, p.39-40]:
I.M.: Well, this whole thing was cleared up by the logician
Tarski, I guess, and some others, maybe Russell or Peano. Any-
how, what you do is, you write down the axioms of your theory
in a formal language,. . . Then you show that you can transform
the hypothesis step by step, using the rules of logic, till you get
a conclusion. That’s a proof.
Student: Really? That’s amazing!. . . I’ve never seen that done
before.
I.M.: Oh, of course no one really does it. It would take forever!
You just show that you could do it, that’s sufficient.
Student: But even that doesn’t sound like what was done in my
courses and textbooks. . . . Then what really is a proof?
I.M.: Well, it’s an argument that convinces someone who knows
the subject.
Student: Someone who knows the subject? Then the definition
of proof is subjective; it depends on particular persons. . .
5Hanna [20] describes these two meanings as “formal” and “acceptable” proofs, re-
spectively, while Devlin [13] characterizes these meanings as “right-wing” and “left-wing”
definitions of proof.
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I.M.: No, no. There’s nothing subjective about it! Everybody
knows what a proof is. . .
In their exchange, the Ideal Mathematician readily admits that the formal
definition of proof does not adequately describe the proofs we actually use,
but is unable to provide a satisfactory way of defining proof as objective.
In this dialogue, the question of how we recognize proofs is addressed.
If it is impractical to write proofs as purely formal proofs, then we instead
consider a proof to be valid when it is accepted by other mathematicians.
As pointed out by Davis and Hersh above, and by others [13, 20, 27, e.g.],
when a mathematician reads a proof to determine its validity, he or she
makes that determination based on whether or not he or she finds the proof
to be convincing.6 That is, the mathematician makes a judgement based
on subjective criteria. The Clay Mathematics Institute, which offers a one
million dollar prize for a proof of any one of seven mathematical conjectures,
stipulates that any proof must be published and accepted by the community
of mathematicians for two years before a prize will be awarded. Because the
validity of a proof depends on acceptance by mathematicians, that validity
is inherently subjective.
This subjectivity should not be taken to imply that Hersh’s practical
meaning of proof abandons notions of rigor. Detlefsen [12] argues that for-
malization and rigor are independent of each other. Under what he refers
to as the “common view,” “Rigor is a necessary feature of proof and for-
malizability is a necessary condition of rigor” [12, p.16]. However, he argues
that mathematical proofs are not presented in a way that makes their for-
malizations either apparent or routine, and in fact, such formalizations are
generally not routine at all. However, proofs are presented in such a way
that makes their rigor clear to the reader. Thus, he argues, formalization
and rigor are independent of each other. While Detlefsen does not expound
on what, exactly, he means by rigor, it appears from his argument that rigor
is a set of standards agreed upon by the community of mathematicians, and
that that set of standards does not include strict formalization of proofs. As
6This is not universally accepted. Weber [62] has argued that the power to convince
an individual or community does not necessarily constitute a proof, nor does an argument
that fails to be completely convincing necessarily fail to be a proof. Furthermore, as Bell
[4, p.24] states, “Conviction is normally reached by quite other means than following a
logical proof.”
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Davis and Hersh [10] point out, it is likely to be impossible to precisely define
this set of standards. The rigor of a proof is made clear to the reader using
communally defined standards for the format of written proofs. Proofs are
generally written in such a way as to make the rigor used by the writer ap-
parent; for instance, by showing that all relevant cases have been considered.
Just as it is likely to be impossible to define the standards of rigor set by the
community of mathematicians, it is also likely to be impossible to define the
standards of the format of written proofs.
Just as mathematicians do not hold a uniform opinion of the meaning
of proof, mathematicians’ practice of creating proofs is varied. Weber [61]
notes that successful mathematical reasoning can take place in at least two
qualitatively different ways, which he and Alcock [63] refer to as syntactic
proof production and semantic proof production. In the former, an individual
produces a proof by focusing on manipulating correctly stated definitions
and facts in a logically valid way; in the latter, the individual will also use
“instantiation(s) of the mathematical object(s) to which the statement ap-
plies to suggest and guide the formal inferences that he or she draws” [63,
p.210]. Some mathematicians work predominantly by proving syntactically,
others by proving semantically. Weber [61] cites Pinto and Tall [43], who
note that Poincare´ distinguished between mathematicians who were “guided
by intuition” and those who were “preoccupied with logic”.
These two ways of reasoning mirror the “formal” and “practical” mean-
ings of proof described above. Weber describes syntactic and semantic proof
production in this way: “A syntactic proof production occurs when . . . the
prover focuses on the definition of the statement to be proven and the rules
for deducing logical consequences from this definition without reference to
other informal representations of the concept. Alternatively, a semantic proof
production occurs when much of the prover’s work takes place by considering
other representations of mathematical concepts . . . such as graphs, diagrams,
kinesthetic gestures, or prototypical examples” [61, p.201]. Just as there are
at least two possible meanings of what we mean by “proof,” there are at least
two ways to go about the task of proving.
Some researchers have made a distinction between “argumentation” and
“proof.” Douek [14] cites Duval [16] as arguing that these are very different,
despite having similar linguistic forms. However, Doeuk argues that argu-
mentation and proof have many aspects in common, and that argumentation
is often useful to the process of proving. Pedemonte [42] considers proof
to be a specialized form of argumentation, and further argues that there
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is evidence of cognitive unity [17] between the argumentation used in the
construction of a conjecture and the construction of a proof of that same
conjecture. Argumentation, however, may not mean the same thing to ev-
eryone: one mathematician’s argumentation may be quite semantic, while
another’s may be more syntactic.
A distinction should also be made between proving and proof. Proving is a
process, which may include arguments and trains of thought which ultimately
lead nowhere. The proof, which is the result of this process, will not include
such dead ends.7 The process of proving, again, may be very different for
different provers.
2. The Roles of Proof
The difficulty of defining mathematical proof is compounded by the fact
that a proof may serve several different roles, depending on the author, the
audience, and the style of the proof. These roles are identified by de Villiers
[11], building on the work of others [3, 4, 20, 31], as verification, explanation,
systematization, discovery, intellectual challenge, and communication [27].
The role of verification may be most familiar to research mathemati-
cians; a theorem is not a theorem until it has been verified to be such by
the construction of a proof. The role of verification is also presented in
mathematics classrooms, but the importance of this role can be missed by
students. Indeed, novice proof writers often complain that it is pointless to
prove theorems that “everybody knows,” or that have already been proven
in the past.
The role of explanation is often typified by proofs in the classroom. In
many classroom contexts, the goal of a proof is not to show that a theo-
rem is true, but to explain why a theorem is true. Of course, this role is
not restricted to the classroom. Mathematicians often value a new, more
elementary proof of a well-established theorem for its explanatory power.
There are several examples of the use of proof for systematization, Eu-
clid’s Elements being the most famous. The Elements collected together
many theorems first proven by earlier Greek mathematicians, and organized
them in such a way that the theorems follow from definitions, axioms, and
7Harel [24] describes proving as an example of a mental act, and defines the result of a
mental act as a way of understanding. Therefore, Harel describes proof as an example of
a way of understanding.
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postulates. The Elements also show that these definitions, axioms and pos-
tulates are sufficient to develop all of what we now call Euclidean geometry.
By systematizing areas of mathematics, mathematicians are able to dispense
with an overabundance of definitions and axioms, and show that a small set
of these capture all of the necessary ideas.
The role of discovery may be somewhat unusual. Historically, the theo-
rems of some areas of mathematics, such as non-Euclidean geometry, were
arrived at through purely deductive means [11]. Non-Euclidean geometry is
a particularly interesting example: by modifying only the fifth postulate, the
so-called “parallel postulate,” of Euclidean geometry, mathematicians have
been able to derive, purely through the use of deductive inference, theorems
that describe the geometry of figures drawn on curved surfaces rather than
the plane. The discovery role of proof can also be seen in the cognitive unity,
discussed above, between the arguments used to form a conjecture and the
proof of that same conjecture [17, 42].
Mathematicians find the intellectual challenge of proofs appealing, as
completing a proof can be very satisfying. de Villiers [11] paraphrases George
Mallory’s famous quotation about his reason for climbing Mount Everest: We
prove our results because they are there. Mathematicians and mathematics
educators hope that their students enjoy the intellectual challenge of writing
proofs, and often try to encourage that enjoyment. The act of proving should
not be a chore for our students, or nothing but a means to an end.
Finally, the role of proof as communication is emphasized by the fact that
proofs are written and read by human beings, and therefore proofs act as a
means of communicating mathematical results between parties. Moreover,
proofs can illustrate a new approach or technique, which might be just what
another mathematician needs to complete his or her own proof of a different
theorem.
The roles identified by de Villiers do not constitute an exhaustive list of all
the possible roles of proof. Auslander [2] adds the role of proof as justification
of definitions. For example, he argues that the proof of the Intermediate
Value Theorem (see below) justifies the definitions of the real number system.
Weber [58] also notes this role in the context of the mathematics classroom,
as well as proofs that illustrate a technique, such as mathematical induction
or proof by contradiction.
These roles can, and often do, overlap. Mathematicians may write proofs
with any of these roles in mind, and the way in which the proof is written
depends on the intended role or roles, and on the intended audience. For
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example, a proof written to verify a theorem, as in a research article, is likely
to be very different than a proof of the same theorem written to explain the
essential ideas to students. Furthermore, the proofs written for the role of
systematization are often quite formal, but not necessarily entirely so. Proofs
written for the purpose of explanation are likely to be less formal.
Two of de Villiers’ roles of proof are worth special consideration. To the
research mathematician on the frontiers of mathematics, the primary role
of proof is that of verification. In the mathematics classroom, however, the
primary role of proof is that of explanation [32]. Mathematics educators
sometimes draw a distinction between “proofs that convince” and “proofs
that explain” [20, 31, 63].8 (Of course, there are proofs that are both con-
vincing and explanatory.) A proof that explains might include explanatory
paragraphs that are not strictly necessary to the proof, may leave out de-
tails that obscure the main ideas, or might be a completely different proof
altogether than a proof that convinces. If the goal of a proof is to convince
the reader, the “best” proof might be the one that is the most concise or the
most general, but if the goal of a proof is to explain, then the “best” proof
is the one that offers the most insight.
For example, the Intermediate Value Theorem is typically justified in
first-year calculus courses using a graphical argument.9 This argument is
meant to explain why the theorem must be true, but does not use the precise
definition of a continuous function. The Intermediate Value Theorem may
also be proved/explained by a thought experiment: If a hang-glider starts
her flight by launching from a point 2,000 feet above sea level, and lands
at a point at sea level, then at some point during her flight, she must be
exactly 1,000 feet above sea level. These arguments are “proofs that explain,”
and may or may not also be convincing. They are certainly not the most
general; the graphical argument found in the appendix relies on a particular,
if generic, graph of a particular function10; the thought experiment of the
hang glider is similarly restricted. Such arguments may contain implicit
assumptions not noticed by the reader. For example, the graphical argument
8It is to this context that Weber [58] adds two other uses of proof in the mathematics
classroom: proofs that justify the use of a definition or axiomatic structure, and proofs
that illustrate a technique.
9This graphical argument can be found in Stewart [51], many other calculus textbooks,
and in the appendix.
10Such “generic” proofs will be discussed in more detail below.
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for the Intermediate Value Theorem applies only to functions on the real
numbers; the theorem is not true for functions on the rational numbers, but
this distinction may not be noticed by the reader [54].
A more formal proof of the Intermediate Value Theorem, based on the
definition of a continuous function, is more general, but may not offer much
insight. A deductive proof of the Intermediate Value theorem requires quite
a bit of mathematical training, and students do not typically encounter such
a proof until an advanced calculus course. Nevertheless, the Intermediate
Value Theorem is used to develop other important results in calculus; the
deductive proof is not necessary for these ideas to be developed if the truth of
the Intermediate Value Theorem is accepted. Historically, modern deductive
proofs of this theorem were not developed until the early nineteenth century,
by Bolzano and Cauchy [18, 48], but the theorem was certainly used much
earlier, on similar visual evidence as that presented in the graphical argument
found in the appendix. Brown [5] argues that the achievement of Bolzano’s
“purely analytical proof” of the Intermediate Value Theorem was that it
proved a theorem independently known to be true though convincing visual
arguments.
A purely formal proof, as noted above, cannot be very complex without
becoming so lengthy as to be incomprehensible to a human reader. Such a
formal proof is rarely able to be explanatory, and may only be convincing to
the degree that it can be read and understood by the reader or checked by a
computer.
3. Students’ Conceptions of Proof
As students progress from grade school, to high school, to undergradu-
ate study, and beyond, they become part of several different mathematical
communities. Throughout their educational careers, students are exposed to,
and participate in, mathematical reasoning, justification, and proof [41]. The
mathematical communities that students participate in have very different
standards of what constitutes a “proof.” For instance, the standard of proof
in grade school is very different from that of a high school geometry class,
which in turn is different than that of undergraduate mathematics classes.
Therefore, students can acquire a wide variety of beliefs about the (subjec-
tive) criteria that make proofs valid and what constitutes a mathematical
proof.
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3.1. Proof Schemes
Harel and Sowder [26, 27] have created a detailed taxonomy of the cog-
nitive characteristics of the act of proving held by students, which they call
proof schemes.11 This framework of proof schemes has been influential in
mathematics education research and has been used, at least to some extent,
in several studies (see, for instance, [25, 33, 45, 66]). Harel and Sowder define
proof scheme with the following: “A person’s (or community’s) proof scheme
consists of what constitutes ascertaining and persuading for that person (or
community)” [27, p.809]. Harel and Sowder use the terms “ascertaining” and
“persuading” to describe complementary processes of convincing oneself and
convincing others. These processes make up the act of proving a statement.
Harel and Sowder’s taxonomy consists of seven major types of proof scheme,
organized into three broader categories: external conviction, empirical, and
deductive.
External conviction proof schemes are possessed by students who are
convinced a theorem is true by external factors. Types of proof scheme in
this category are ritual, non-referential symbolic, and authoritative. Ritual
proof schemes are held by students convinced by the form or appearance of
a proof. For example, students who have only seen two-column proofs may
be convinced a proof is valid only because it follows a two-column format.
Non-referential symbolic proof schemes are held by students who are con-
vinced by symbolic manipulation, but the symbols and manipulations have
no potential system of referents. Harel and Sowder [27] give the incorrect
algebraic reduction of (a + b)/(c + b) = (a + /b)/(c + /b) = a/c as evidence
of a non-referential symbolic proof scheme. The last subcategory of external
conviction proof schemes is authoritative proof schemes, which describe the
proof schemes of students who are convinced by an external authority, such
as an instructor or textbook, that a theorem is true. There is a place for
this proof scheme (for instance, many mathematicians who are not expert in
elliptic curves are convinced that Fermat’s Last Theorem has been proven
based on the verification of their peers, not because they have read and un-
derstood Andrew Wiles’ proof themselves), however, this cannot be used by
a student to write his or her own proofs.
Empirical proof schemes describe the proof schemes of students who are
11Harel [24] describes proof schemes as ways of thinking, which he defines as cognitive
characteristics of a mental act (in this case, the mental act of proving).
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convinced by evidence from examples or perceptions, rather than logical rea-
soning. This category includes inductive and perceptual proof schemes. In-
ductive proof schemes are evidenced by a student who is convinced by seeing
a few examples (or even just a single example).12 Perceptual proof schemes
are held by students who are convinced of a theorem’s truth by a rudimen-
tary mental image or perception. Perceptual proof schemes might contain
some elements of a deductive proof, but the mental image possessed by the
student is not developed enough to involve transformations of the image or
the consequences of such transformations.
Students (and mathematicians) who hold deductive proof schemes prove
and validate theorems by means of logical deductions which are general
enough to account for all cases. This category includes transformational
proof schemes and axiomatic proof schemes. When a transformational proof
scheme is held, students base their proofs on a fully developed mental image
capable of transformations and reasoning about an object in such a way that
all the necessary relationships are explored. Transformational proof schemes
require a deep understanding of the concepts at hand in order to work with
these advanced mental images. It is important to note that mental image, in
this context, can be defined as a mental construct which “supports thought
experiments and support reasoning by way of quantitative relationships” [56,
p.230], and can be thought of as a concept image [55] of the objects under
consideration. As before, this image does not have to be visual in nature.
Transformational proofs contain all the necessary logical inferences that are
present for a valid proof of the theorem, but do not organize them into an
axiomatic scheme. When a student understands that mathematical theorems
are based, at least in principle, on axioms and can make deductions based
on an axiomatic system, they are said to have an axiomatic proof scheme.13
Some further examples of proofs that evoke different proof schemes can be
found in the appendix.
Harel and Sowder consider axiomatic proof schemes to be an extension of
transformational proof schemes, in the sense that students must first possess
12Inductive proof schemes should not be confused with the technique of mathematical
induction.
13It is important to note that even when individuals possess deductive proof schemes,
they may still make errors which invalidate the proofs they write. These errors may spring
from misconceptions, faults in logic, or simple carelessness. A list of some common student
errors is given in Selden and Selden [49].
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transformational proof schemes before developing axiomatic proof schemes,
and that students in possession of axiomatic proof schemes can also appre-
ciate the underlying formal constructs [26]. Harel and Sowder differentiate
further subcategories of transformational and axiomatic proof schemes, but
one in particular is noteworthy for this discussion: the referential symbolic
proof scheme. This proof scheme is described in the following way: “In the
referential symbolic proof scheme, to prove or refute an assertion or to solve
a problem, one learns to represent the situation algebraically and performs
symbol manipulations on the resulting expressions, with the intention to de-
rive information relevant to the problem at hand” [27, p.811]. If taken to
the extreme, the referential symbolic proof scheme is very close to the formal
meaning of proof.
An individual or community may hold to more than one category of proof
scheme, depending on the subject matter and context at hand. For example,
a mathematician might use an axiomatic proof scheme while proving some-
thing for himself or herself, a transformational proof scheme when proving a
theorem to a student, and an authoritative proof scheme when accepting a
theorem outside his or her field based on the word of a colleague.
Harel and Sowder’s use of the term “proof schemes” underscores their
subjective interpretation of the word proof in this context: Proof is what
establishes truth for a given individual or community. This interpretation is
related to that of the above discussion of the subjective nature of proof: The
practical meaning of proof implies that what constitutes the act of proving for
mathematicians (and their students) is agreed upon by the community itself.
That said, the proof schemes of the mathematical community have changed
greatly over time, and continue to evolve [8]. Roughly speaking, the math-
ematical community requires deductive proof schemes for the production of
proofs, but as Weber [60] has found, mathematicians do not exclusively rely
on deductive methods when determining the validity of a proof.
As discussed above, in other communities, different proof schemes may
be used. In an elementary school classroom, the weight of several examples
might be enough to “prove” that the sum of two even numbers is always
even, for example. When these same students reach high school geometry
classes, they may try to use similar empirical evidence to justify theorems
[9], but such a proof scheme is not generally acceptable in these communities.
Furthermore, as Recio and Godino [45] point out, the (informal) arguments
used in daily life to convince self and others of a proposition may be quite
different than those produced by deductive reasoning, and students may have
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difficulty distinguishing the two. For example, empirical evidence may be
convincing in many “everyday” cases, but may not be convincing in the
context of a mathematical community.
Therefore, proof schemes can be thought of as an example of a sociomath-
ematical norm [15]. This term, coined by Yackel and Cobb [64], refers to
the mathematical practices and standards developed (explicitly or implic-
itly) by a mathematical community. Clearly, the sociomathematical norms
(including proof schemes) of different communities may vary widely. In the
context of a particular classroom, sociomathematical norms are influenced
by the textbook used, the feedback and comments from the instructor, and
the opinions and beliefs of peers, and other, more subtle, factors. However,
these influences often contradict each other. Furthermore, the sociomathe-
matical norms (including standards of proof) are rarely explicitly discussed
in courses which require proof [15]. Rather, the sociomathematical norms
are usually derived implicitly from instructor feedback or comments in class.
For example, Harel and Rabin [25] identify teaching practices (such as guid-
ing students toward the teacher’s preferred solution approach, a low level of
interaction between students, and a lack of deductive justifications used in
class) that are likely to foster authoritative proof schemes in students.
The beliefs about proof held by teachers can have a profound effect on
the beliefs held by students. Knuth [37] found that some high school teachers
may not have a clear concept of the generality of a proof, or use empirical
evidence when evaluating the validity of a proof. It is possible that these
beliefs may influence the proof schemes of these teachers’ students.
4. Pedagogy and Proof
When discussing the pedagogy of teaching the ideas and techniques of
mathematical proof, it is useful to reconsider our original question, “what
do we mean by mathematical proof?” One goal of our teaching could be
to help our students, at least at the undergraduate level, to begin to think
like mathematicians.14 However, it is not obvious what it means to “think
like a mathematician.”15 As discussed above, mathematicians may have a
14As Weber [61] points out, it is unlikely that most students will be able to develop
the deep intuition and conceptual understanding of mathematical domains relied on by
mathematicians in the course of a single semester.
15Entire books have been written on the subject; see for instance, [6].
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formal meaning, a practical meaning, or some combination of the two in
mind when they discuss proof. Furthermore, mathematicians may hold to
different meanings of proof depending on the intended role of the proof.
Finally, both syntactic and semantic reasoning may be used to successfully
prove theorems, and mathematicians, teachers, and students often find that
they prefer syntactic reasoning over semantic, or vice-versa. It is reasonable
to assume that those who prefer syntactic reasoning may be drawn to a
formal meaning of proof, while those disposed to semantic reasoning may
prefer the practical meaning of proof. As both types of reasoning are viable,
it is important for mathematics instructors to be aware of, allow for, and
even to encourage both types of reasoning, regardless of the instructor’s own
preferences and personal meaning of proof.
As the mathematics curriculum in the United States currently stands,
students are generally insulated from the practical meaning of proof in math-
ematics courses at the secondary school level. Students are traditionally in-
troduced to the term “mathematical proof” in high school geometry classes,
where they are taught that proofs are highly organized, usually using two
columns, in which each line must be deduced from the lines above using
some “rule of geometry” [30]. In short, high school students are introduced
to the formal meaning of mathematical proof.16
As Herbst [30] points out, this way of including mathematical proof at
the high school level is advantageous in that it allows students to acquire
a generalized notion of proof and brings stability to the geometry curricu-
lum. However, at the same time, this method of formalization divorces the
formal act of proving from the construction of knowledge, and as a result,
high school students are implicitly asked to focus only on the former at the
expense of the latter. Thus, students can come to believe that proving is a
purely formal activity, and may only become engaged in proving when ex-
plicitly asked to do so, and even then, only when certain prerequisites are
given [29]. Students may or may not be concerned with the questions that
mathematicians are concerned with, such as whether the proof is valid or
convincing [29]. While high-school geometry students may be encouraged to
reason using diagrams and other less formal ideas by some instructors, other
instructors may discourage these ideas, at least in the discussion of mathe-
16This way of introducing geometric reasoning and proof is not universal. In China, for
example, teaching practices reflect the influence of Confucianism [36].
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matical proof. This discouragement is reflected in the common mantra, “A
picture is not a proof” [34, 35].
One stated reason for including mathematical proof in high school geom-
etry classes is to help students understand logical reasoning, with the goal of
developing the ability to apply such reasoning in broader contexts. However,
it is unclear that this goal is achieved if students only associate proof with
formal, two-column proofs.
After completing a high-school geometry class, students are rarely explic-
itly asked to write mathematical proofs again unless they study mathematics
as undergraduate students. Even at the undergraduate level, students are of-
ten taught that proofs are written by applying logical rules to successive lines
of a proof. In other words, students are often taught to prove syntactically.
Furthermore, the proofs that are shown to students as examples are usually
highly polished. The processes used by mathematicians are often rough and
informal, but students typically see proofs in their final forms, and rarely
witness the process of creating a “rough draft.” As a result, students often
do not know where to begin when writing their own proofs [40].
It is often simpler to focus on syntactic proof production when intro-
ducing proofs to students. The skills and knowledge required for semantic
proof production are far more complex than for syntactic proof production.
However, the scope of theorems that can be proved syntactically may be
more limited than that of semantic proof production, and syntactic proofs
can sometimes leave the proof writer feeling like he or she does not have a
complete understanding of the concept [63]. On the other hand, Harel and
Sowder argue that students who can reason intuitively but not formally are
restricted in the scope of theorems they can prove [26], and intuitive ideas
can certainly be incorrect.17 Thus, it would seem that both formal and intu-
itive ways of thinking are valuable. Indeed, as Weber and Alcock point out
[61, 63], and as discussed above, successful reasoning can be carried out both
by relying on the logic and formal structures of syntactic reasoning, and by
relying on the informal representations of mathematical objects of semantic
17Harel and Sowder give the example of a finite geometry as a context in which intuition
alone is inadequate for proving theorems [27] Certainly, this is true for students beginning
to work in an unfamiliar area of mathematics that bears little resemblance to our “usual”
contexts. However, it is likely that mathematicians who work in such areas of mathematics
so, in fact, develop such intuitions; for example, Thurston [57] describes his development
of intuitions about hyperbolic three-manifolds.
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reasoning.
Several proposals to improve students ability to write proofs seek to do
so by helping students connect the meaning of mathematical concepts to
the proofs they write. Thus, these proposals intend to help students to
develop a semantic way of proving, intended to convince the reader, which
can complement students’ previous experience with syntactic reasoning.
Raman [44] has proposed that it is necessary for students to be aware of
both the public and private aspects of a proof, and the key ideas that bridge
the two. Private aspects include the mental structures that are used to
formulate ideas, while public aspects are the structures needed to complete
the proof and make it rigorous. A “key idea” is a heuristic idea that is
developed enough that it can be made into a proof (or part of a proof) by
applying appropriate rigor (by which Raman means “sufficient rigor for a
particular mathematical community” [p.320]). By focusing on the key ideas
of a theorem, Raman suggests that students can use those key ideas to help
structure a proof.
Some mathematicians and mathematics educators have proposed that
alternative forms of proof may be more useful to beginning proof writers.
Among these are generic proofs [52], in which theorems are proved by gen-
eralizing from examples. A generic proof reasons from a particular example
that acts as a “prototype” for a class of examples, and should be interpreted
as representing a general situation. The graphical argument for the Inter-
mediate Value Theorem, described above, is an example of a generic proof:
The graph provided is a particular graph, but it represents any graph that
is continuous from a to b [54]. The values of a, b, f(a), f(b), etc., are not
important, and these values are not stated. In the version given in the ap-
pendix of this article, a “generic” graph of a function has been drawn, but
the details of this graph are not important. It is not important, for example,
that the value of f(a) be less than that of f(b), or that the function be dif-
ferentiable everywhere. Harel [23] considers these generic proofs to fall under
the heading of transformational proof schemes.
Another proposed alternative is structural proof [38]. Structural proofs
are intended to be proofs that both convince and explain. The term “struc-
tural” describes a process of organizing the proof into conceptual levels, in
which one level is built upon another. The first level provides a global view of
the proof, while ‘deeper’ levels fill in the details. A structural proof includes,
along with its “formal” argument, informal practices such as the inclusion of
a short overview of the proof, and frequent explanatory passages in the proof
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itself. Once a beginning student has mastered these informal proofs, then
the process of making proofs more rigorous can begin. A detailed exposition
of generic and structural proofs is given in Alibert and Thomas [1].
In the same paper, Alibert and Thomas argue for the use of scientific
debate in the classroom. That is, students are encouraged to challenge the
arguments of their peers in class, providing students with first-hand experi-
ence as to what arguments are necessary to convince others of the truth of
a proposition. This experience, in turn, helps students to see proof as an
integral part of mathematics rather than a frustrating, unnecessary exercise.
A related method of classroom instruction is the so-called modified Moore
method, sometimes referred to as Texas-style instruction, inquiry-based learn-
ing, or discovery learning. In this method of instruction, based on the teach-
ing style of R. L. Moore, an instructor will introduce definitions and perhaps
a few examples, but all theorems in the material will be proved by the stu-
dents. Students will present proofs of theorems in class, while other students
critique them. Only after a proof has been accepted by the entire class (in-
cluding the instructor) will the class move on to the next theorem. If the
students are unable to prove a theorem, the instructor may provide a simpler
theorem, or a few very general hints, but the main points of the proof come
from the students.18 Students learning under the modified Moore method
are exposed to the social aspects of proof, especially the notion that proofs
must be accepted as such by a mathematical community. A recent study
of prospective secondary teachers’ perceptions of mathematical proof found
that students in a modified Moore method classroom “held more humanistic
perspectives of mathematical proof than those in traditional sections” [65,
p.302]. According to this study, students taking classes using the modified
Moore method were more likely to define proof as a convincing and logical
argument, rather than as a formal argument, were more willing to accept
different forms of proof as valid, saw a greater variety of roles of proof, and
emphasized the explanatory role of proof more than their counterparts in
traditional classes.
New technology has impacted mathematics teaching on all levels, and the
teaching of proof is no exception. In high school level classes, the teaching
of geometry and geometric proofs have been enhanced by dynamic geometry
18A more complete description of the Moore method, especially as it is used in under-
graduate courses, is given by Mahavier [39].
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environments, or DGEs. Popular DGEs include Geometer’s Sketchpad and
Cabri Geometry. These software packages allow students to explore geomet-
ric objects and environments, test conjectures, and ‘discover’ new properties
of geometric objects [21]. These DGEs may help to create cognitive unity [17]
between the conjectures students create and the proofs of those theorems.
Thus, they may help students to connect informal arguments made during
the formulation of conjectures to more formal arguments made in proving
those conjectures.
5. Concluding Remarks
Because mathematical proof is a human endeavor, and because purely
formal proofs of interesting theorems are too lengthy to be of value to human
readers, the question of “what, exactly, is a proof?” becomes a question
for communities of mathematicians, educators, philosophers, and students
to debate. Different communities may agree on different answers to this
question; the worldwide community of mathematicians may never entirely
agree on a single answer to this question. Certainly, for mathematics students
and mathematicians, deductive reasoning, definitions, and axioms are all
crucial to proving, but so are the meanings of mathematical objects and
ideas. The proofs written by the members of a community are intended to
convince other members of the same community, according to these implicitly
agreed upon standards. That these standards cannot be explicitly stated does
not make them any less real or important.
Complicating the matter is the fact that mathematical proof may be used
in different, but related, roles. The intended role of a proof often affects how
a proof is written, and we may be more comfortable with relaxing the level
of formality of a proof in certain contexts. This might be most clearly seen
in the distinction between “proofs that convince” and “proofs that explain.”
In the context of research mathematics, a proof that convinces can be quite
formal; such a proof is convincing to the degree that we trust that the formal
definitions and axioms adequately frame the problem and that the author has
correctly followed rules of deduction. In the context of the classroom, a proof
that explains is often preferred. Such a proof may not necessarily rely on
definitions, axioms, and formal reasoning, but will attempt to communicate
meaning and understanding to the students.
Because we are unable to precisely define what a proof is, we should not
be surprised that our students often fail to successfully meet our (implicit and
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evolving) standards of proof, both in recognizing proofs and in creating their
own proofs. Some students fail to meet our standards of rigor. For example,
some students may consider empirical arguments to be “good enough,” if
they possess an inductive proof scheme. Other students may exhibit a non-
referential symbolic proof scheme or ritual proof scheme by focusing too
closely on formalization, and miss the meaning of the formalized objects
they are working with. One challenge for educators is to help students to
understand the value of formal, axiomatic proofs, while at the same time
helping students to connect meaning to these formal constructions. Since
both syntactic and semantic proof production are viable ways of writing
proofs for mathematicians, it stands to reason that some students will be
more successful if encouraged to reason syntactically, while others may reason
semantically. Mathematics classes that introduce proof have tended to focus
on syntactic reasoning. However, some recent efforts are underway to help
students understand the meaning of the syntax and, in so doing, help students
to reason semantically as well as syntactically.
Hersh has written, “In the mathematics classroom, the motto is: ‘Proof
is a tool in service of teacher and class, not a shackle to restrain them.’ In
teaching future mathematicians, ‘Proof is a tool in service of research, not
a shackle on the mathematician’s imagination’” [32, p.60]. Ultimately, if we
pretend in the mathematics classroom that mathematical proof only has a
formal meaning, and can only be created through formal, syntactic reasoning,
we treat proof as if it is a shackle. By doing so, we deceive ourselves, and
worse, we deceive our students.
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Appendix A. A graphical proof of the Intermediate Value Theo-
rem
The Intermediate Value Theorem states that if a function f is continuous
on a closed interval [a, b], and u is any number between f(a) and f(b) inclu-
sive, then there exists at least one number c in the closed interval [a, b] such
that f(c) = u. The graph below explains why this theorem must be true.
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Clearly, in order for the function to reach f(b), it must pass through a
point with a value of u. The only way to avoid doing so would be to “jump”
over the value u, but a function that contains such “jumps” is not continuous.
Appendix B. Some examples of proofs using different proof schemes
Below are five proofs of a theorem of set theory: if A ⊆ B, then A∪B = B.
These are meant to serve as examples of proofs that might be written, or
accepted as “convincing,” by individuals with different proof schemes.
Symbolic non-referential:
If A ⊆ B, then B ⊇ A.
Thus, A ∪B = B ∩ A.
Since A ∩B ⊆ B, B ⊆ B ∪ A.
Therefore, B = A ∪B, and A ∪B = B.2
This (nonsensical) argument is “symbolic non-referential,” as the mathemat-
ical symbols used cannot have any mathematical meaning.
Inductive:
Suppose that A = {a, b, c}, and B = {a, b, c, d, e}.
Then A ⊆ B.
Also, A ∪B = {a, b, c, d, e} = B.
Therefore, if A ⊆ B, then A ∪B = B.2
This argument is inductive; it determines the conclusion based on a single
example.
Perceptual:
In this diagram we can see that A ⊆ B:
From this diagram, we can also see that A ∪B = B.2
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This argument is perceptual, as it argues from a particular diagram. This di-
agram is not flexible enough to be “transformational,” but a student making
this argument may be able to develop this argument further.
Transformational:
If A ⊆ B, then A is completely contained in B.
Thus, A does not add anything to B when A and B are “unioned”
together.
Thus, A ∪B is contained in B.
Also, B is contained in A ∪B, so A ∪B = B.2
This argument is transformational, as it relies on a mental image capable of
incorporating the necessary ideas.
Axiomatic:
Let x be in A ∪B.
If x ∈ A, then, since A ⊆ B, x ∈ B.
Therefore A ∪B ⊆ B.
Also, if x ∈ B, then x ∈ A ∪B by definition.
Therefore B ⊆ A ∪B.
Since A ∪B ⊆ B and B ⊆ A ∪B, A ∪B = B.2
This argument is axiomatic, in that it relies (at least in part) on the defini-
tions and axioms of the relevant mathematical objects.
